The secondary literature on the Labour Party's relations with nationalist groups in the periphery, the role of trade unions in the Cold War and the Atlanticist instincts of the Party's revisionists offer useful context for an examination of Jagan's downfall. Existing interpretations of the development of Labour's colonial policy during the opposition years of the 1950s and early 1960s tend to portray it as a period during which the party carved out a singular and effective critique of late imperial Conservative policy. The Suez crisis, the Hola camp massacres in Kenya and the Devlin report's exposure of the problems of the Central African Federation, offered Labour the opportunity to distinguish their progressive ideas from those of their reactionary opponents.
ii By contrast, the reluctant bipartisanship which prevailed when Guianese affairs were debated in 1953 and 1964 demonstrates the limits of the metropolitan left's anticolonialism. The precedents for Labour's hostility to Jagan can be found in the suspicion of anticolonial nationalism which prevailed for much of the party's first half century. In his work on the party's Indian policy, Owen illustrated the tendency of British Labour to adopt a paternal rather than fraternal attitude towards Indian nationalism.
The purported waywardness of their anticolonial charges often threatened complete estrangement, most notably during the Quit India campaign of the Second World War. accorded to a form of politics which fell outside the sphere of state-to-state international diplomacy. However, as the story of Driberg's introduction to Forbidden Freedom suggests, these forms of transnational association were always precarious and often ineffectual.
Guianese affairs did not float free from national contexts and the particular traditions forged within the nation state are relevant. It was the inherent inequality of the colonial relationship which enabled British Labour to impose solutions which reflected their priorities on to the Guianese labour scene, which had been developing its own traditions before the decisive intervention of 1953. Labour's paternalism in dealing with anticolonial nationalists, the militantly anti-Soviet line of the British TUC and tensions between liberationists and
Atlanticists within the parliamentary party mark a distinctive national tradition. British social democrats tended to interpret colonial affairs through the lens of metropolitan and international conflicts rather than in terms of global processes of colonial liberation. Despite these caveats the late British empire provide a fertile field from which historians can respond to the emphasis which Price has given, in his gloss on a recent essay by van der Linden, to 'the importance of understanding that the local patterns and structures of labour's experience In contrast to British conditions, labour radicalism in Guiana had an agrarian rather than an industrial tinge. The country had its dockworkers, its civil servants, its taxi drivers, its shopworkers and even its miners in the bauxite industry, but those who endured some of the worst labour conditions were the very large class of plantation workers. During the inter-war period incremental reforms were implemented against a background of enduring socioeconomic stagnation in rural areas. Violence on the plantations was common and in the late 1930s a strike on the Leonora Estate in Demerara developed into a wider insurrection. In the aftermath of the rebellion, responsibility for organising agrarian labour fell to the Manpower The party's colonial spokesman James Griffiths quibbled with Lyttelton over his justification for ousting the PPP, while insisting 'we stand by democratic parties and the democratic unions affiliated with the ICFTU.' xxx Having met the PPP leader the day before, Attlee was more avid in his criticism of Jagan's government than he was of Churchill's. He reported: 'I have seen the leaders of the PPP and had a considerable talk with them. They did not in any way disabuse me of the idea that they were behaving extremely unwisely and that they were September and were scheduled for 7 December. This decision represented an endorsement of Sandys's plan to oust Jagan. It was also a triumph for the Atlanticists in the Party whose priority was pacifying critics of the PPP in Washington. In many respects it replicated the decision taken by the Attlee-led party ten years earlier to offer at least partial endorsement to the ousting of the first elected PPP government. At that time, and even without an American president to prod them, Labour's leaders reacted in a surprisingly complaisant fashion as Lyttelton removed the newly elected government in a display of unvarnished imperial force.
As far as the Gaitskellites were concerned Jagan's cultivation of and by the WFTU, the Bevanites and the British Communist Party sealed his fate. To that extent, the end of empire in Guiana offers validation for Whiting's argument that decolonisation was marked by consensus and that the leaders of the two major parties found more in common with one ambivalence, the British TUC enabled them to play a decisive role in destabilising Jagan's government. To that extent the conflict between the MPCA and its Jaganite rivals in the trade union movement was a proxy for divisions within the global labour movement. What is clear from the Guyanese case is that bilateral relations between colonial and metropolitan labour movements cannot be studied in isolation from these wider ideological and institutional
